

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 691129



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 29 November 1969


NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968 - 1969
weekly average for each month





OCTOBER -- DECEMBER 1969
weekly data as reported*





US BATTLE DEATHS dropped significantly from the previous week's 130 to 72 for this week.





SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS also decreased from the very high 567 of last week to a reported 291 this week. This total probably will increase considerably as late reports are received.





INFILTRATORS ENTERING PIPELINE appeared to drop as only five small groups were detected with a total strength of 522. Other groups may be on the move, but the heavy flow scheduled to begin on 20 November has not yet been detected. An apparent bottleneck may be causing delays near the top of the pipeline. Some 9,500 troops have entered the pipeline since late October.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS data are not yet available, but the low level of enemy activity was reflected in the decrease in both friendly and enemy casualties. The enemy continued to avoid large unit contact but utilized attacks by fire and very limited ground probes to maintain pressure.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION declined for the first time in four weeks from the previous week's 3,201 to 2,117 for this week.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by enemy killed by the SVN decreased from the previous week's 49% of enemy killed to this week's 46%.



*Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary. South Vietnamese battle death figures, for instance, commonly show major upward changes.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The past week was characterized by scattered attacks by fire and limited ground probes as the enemy continued to avoid large-unit contacts. Considerable evidence indicates that the enemy is making preparations for an upsurge in activity during December but the reporting lacks consistency as to timing and intensity. Another series of coordinated "high points" before the end of the year appears possible but an all-out country-wide Tet-type offensive does not seem likely during this time frame. If attacks are launched, they probably will be of the artillery or sapper type in an attempt to inflict heavy allied casualties with as little cost to the Communists as possible.

Enemy Infiltration

In addition to the five groups detected this week, gaps in numerical designators of those already observed suggest that 14 other groups may be on the move or preparing to enter the pipeline. Infiltration groups appear to be experiencing delays due to an unexplained bottleneck in North Vietnam. Poor weather and transportation problems could be contributing factors to the current delays which may explain why the heavy flow scheduled to begin on 20 November has not yet been detected.

Communist Political Developments

Xuan Thuy, Chief of the DRV delegation in Paris, used the press and radio on three occasions last week to counter U.S. charges that Hanoi was responsible for the impasse in the Paris talks. Thuy's expressed willingness to hold additional private talks with U.S. officials was probably aimed chiefly at regaining the propaganda initiative, but may also have reflected concern that Ambassador Lodge's resignation represented a "downgrading" of the talks. Thuy's action is the first indication in some time that Hanoi does not want the talks to simply languish. Meanwhile, Colonel Loi, military advisor to the GVN delegation, believes that the more flexible attitude of the Communists at the 25 November session on the questions of unilateral withdrawal and coalition government was also the result of their concern over possible "downgrading" of the talks.

South Vietnamese Political Developments

Colonel Loi also reports that the delegation, including Ambassador Lam himself, is uncertain as to President Thieu's policy relative to private communications between members of the delegation and the Communists. Lam is even reluctant to report to Thieu any indications of interest on the part of the Communists in private talks, fearing misinterpretation in the president's office of any such secret contacts. This is especially true since the recent disclosures of Communist penetrations at high levels in Saigon. Lam did, however, authorize Loi to respond positively to repeated invitations from a prominent pro-Communist member of the Paris community who seems to be attempting to open up a channel of communication to the GVN delegation. As for private talks between U.S. and North Vietnamese officials, Loi says most members of his delegation recognize that any subject, including unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal and coalition government, could be discussed.